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1    
Introduction 
 On October 16, 2008, the U.S. Department of State announced its plans to implement the 
Iraq Cultural Heritage Project (ICHP), an initiative to assist in the preservation of the ancient 
history of Iraq.1 Immediately thereafter the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad awarded a grant of nearly 
$13 million to International Relief and Development, a non-governmental organization, to begin 
rebuilding Iraq’s cultural past.2 The Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs followed suit by providing an additional $1 million to the initiative and proclaimed that it 
would spearhead efforts to secure up to $6 million in private sector contributions.3 The Iraqi 
State Board of Antiquities and Heritage responded with plans to enhance funding directly from 
the Iraqi national parliament to complement American efforts at Iraqi cultural heritage 
preservation.4
 The U.S. Department of State’s dedication to the preservation of Iraqi cultural heritage 
seems quite unprecedented. For starters, the general American attitude towards cultural heritage 
protection is viewed as far below the expectations set by the international community. This is 
evidenced by the U.S.’s decades long delay in ratifying the 1954 Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Conflict (1954 Hague Convention), which was 
ratified in March 2009
  
5, and the U.S. adopting only two provisions of the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of 
Cultural Property (1970 UNESCO Convention)6
                                                                                                                
1 State Dep’t Press Release 2008/880, 2008 WLNR 19803295, (released, Oct. 16, 2008). 
, adding a disclaimer to their adoption that the 
2 State Dep’t Press Release 2008/878, 2008 WLNR 19803290, (released, Oct. 16, 2008). 
3 Id.  
4 Id.  
5 Corine Wegener, The 1954 Hague Convention and Preserving Cultural Heritage, 
ARCHEOLOGICAL INST. OF AM., Oct. 19, 2010, http://www.archaeological.org/news/hca/3137. 
6 General Conference of the UNESCO, Paris, France, Nov. 14, 1970, 16th Sess., 
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“United States reserves the right to determine whether or not to impose export controls over 
cultural property.”7 Moreover, it was only in 2001 that the U.S. began making efforts at 
international cultural heritage protection by creating a grant program awarding requests for 
cultural heritage assistance by U.S. ambassadors stationed around the globe.8 Even then, in 2001, 
for example, out of the $3 million requested for aiding 140 cultural heritage protection projects 
around the world, the U.S. Department of State only awarded $1 million total, disbursed amongst 
those 140 projects.9 In 2002, project requests dropped to 129 proposals of which only 50 were 
honored around the world.10 The U.S. Departments of Commerce, Justice and State combined 
allotted $1 million to be shared amongst the 50 honored requests.11
  What the U.S. Department of State is currently doing in Iraq then appears to be more than 
the typical cultural heritage protection assistance the U.S. provides to other countries around the 
world. In fact, the financial assistance is probably more accurately described as foreign aid 
possibly in response to the direct American involvement in the destruction of Iraqi cultural 
heritage during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.  The U.S. government incurred scathing 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Recommendation adopted, 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13039&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html#STATE_PARTIES. 
7 Id.  
8 U.S. Dep’t of State, The Ambassador’s Fund for Cultural Preservation, Bureau of Educational 
and Cultural Affairs, http://exchanges.state.gov/heritage/afcp.html  (Last  visited  December  19,  2010). 
9 U.S. Dep’t of State, The Ambassador’s Fund for Cultural Preservation 2001 Report, (2001) 
http://exchanges.state.gov/uploads/rZ/vv/rZvv7Ob9u_d5DgF-VmvWGA/2001AFCPannual.pdf. 
10 U.S. Dep’t of State, The Ambassador’s Fund for Cultural Preservation 2002 Report, (2002) 
http://exchanges.state.gov/uploads/Iv/sR/IvsRL9EsyqEDQ32LCWnyCw/2002-
3AFCPannual.pdf. 
11 Id.  
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attacks by the international community for its failure to protect the Iraq National Museum from 
looters and for its destruction of the ancient city of Babylon during their occupation in 2003.12
 Generally, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which administers 
the bulk of international economic assistance, defines foreign aid as financial assistance to 
promote foreign economic growth, reduce international poverty, and combat the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic.
  
13 However, recent congressional research reports have included promoting 
democracy, conflict prevention, and even domestic defense in their definition of fostering foreign 
aid.14
 The question now is, given the situation the U.S. has faced with Iraq in the last seven or 
so years, is the U.S. Department of State creating a new category of foreign aid by doling out 
funds for cultural heritage development or are the funds the very same economic growth 
stimulation and poverty prevention methods the U.S. has used for all nations since at least the 
end of World War II? Or rather, did the U.S. create the ICHP merely as a response to the sharp 
criticism received during the 2003 invasion of Iraq where American forces participated in, or 
passively permitted, the destruction of countless forms of Iraqi cultural heritage? Regardless of 
what the more narrow answer will be, an important precedent in the American involvement in 
international cultural heritage protection is about to be set.   
 
 In reviewing the actions of the U.S. Department of State in response to the destruction of 
Iraqi cultural heritage, I will first discuss Iraqi history and the background facts leading up to the 
                                                                                                                
12 Karin E. Borke, Searching for a Solution: An Analysis of the Legislative Response to the Iraqi 
Antiquities Crisis of 2003, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J.ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 381, 403 (2003). 
13 USAID Primer What We Do and How We Do it, USAID, Jan. 2006,  
http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/PDACG100.pdf 
14 Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy, Congressional Research 
Service Report for Congress, Apr. 15, 2004, 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31987.pdf 
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U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Next, I will discuss two separate events involving U.S. 
troops and the destruction of Iraqi cultural heritage: first, the initially passive response of U.S. 
troops to the obliteration of the Iraq National Museum and second, the U.S. occupation of the 
ancient city of Babylon. When dealing with each section, I will discuss basic facts describing 
American involvement in these events, American international law (or even domestic law) 
obligations when dealing with cultural heritage, and whether the U.S. lived up to their 
obligations. Finally, I will discuss current American operations at rebuilding and restoring Iraqi 
cultural heritage. I will analyze whether the current American approach falls into the American 
definition of foreign aid and what, if anything, will foreign aid do for fostering Iraqi identity.  
 
 I. Background Information 
The story of the Iraqi Cultural Heritage Crisis begins with the fact that Iraq is home to 
very ancient civilizations. Following the First World War, the Iraqi government began to take 
steps towards protecting its antiquities and cultural heritage. However, those measures were 
thwarted by the time of the Gulf War, when Iraqi people, themselves, began to engage in the 
illegal trading of antiquities. The situation increases in intensity by the time of the American 
invasion of Iraq in 2003.    
A.  Early Iraqi History 
 Nestled between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, modern day Iraq is the successor of 
ancient Mesopotamia: the land between two rivers. Mesopotamia has long been heralded as “the 
place where civilization began.”15
                                                                                                                
15 McGuire Gibson, Where Civilization Began, ARCHAEOLOGY, Jul. 2003. 
 Historical traditions in Mesopotamia preexist even ancient 
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Egyptian traditions so much that Mesopotamia is the “foundation of all ideas of civilizations.”16 
Therefore, it is no surprise that modern day Iraq features a number of the world’s “firsts” and 
some of the most important and highly regarded archaeological sites.17 Examples include: 
Babylon, over 4,000 years old, capital of the world for 1,000 years, and home to the foundations 
of the Biblical Tower of Babel along with the original remains of the Ishtar gate; Erbil, one of 
the oldest continually inhabited cities where settlers arrived, and have stayed, for over 8,000 
years; and Uruk, the first large city in Mesopotamia and home to some of the earliest-known 
writings.18 These cities, among others, are home to over 10,000 registered archaeological sites 
throughout Iraq.19
 The breadth of available Iraqi antiquities is slim. Despite the yearly discovery of 
previously unearthed ancient cities in Iraq, excavation of individual treasures has proven 
difficult.
  
20 Stacks of ancient Mesopotamian civilizations are difficult to separate given that 
ancient cities were built upon each other.21 Moreover, it is difficult to locate individual items of 
archaeological significance given that the wide array of artifacts and art found in ancient cities 
are in burial grounds and the ancient Iraqis, unlike their Egyptian counterparts, buried their 
deceased without any surrounding art, jewelry or other funerary pieces.22
                                                                                                                
16 Id.  
 
17 John Malcom Russell, Iraq in the Crosshairs, An Uncertain Future for the Past, ICON 
MAGAZINE, Spring 2003, available at http://www.wmf.org/sites/default/files/wmf_article/pg_26-
29_iraq.pdf. (detailing several of Iraq’s most significant archaeological sites). 
18 Id. Other sites include: Hatra, an important ancient religious center; Nineveh, imperial capital 
to the Biblical King Sennacherib; and Ur, the birthplace of Abraham. Id. 
19 Borke, supra note 12, at 383. 
20 Amy E. Miller, The Looting of Iraqi Art: Occupiers and Collectors Turn Away Leisurely from 
the Disaster, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 49, 52 (2005).  
21 Id.  
22 Id.  
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 The difficulty in locating and separating Iraqi artifacts leads to their significant draw in 
international art and antiquities markets.23 Typically, market prices remain high for antiquities 
for two key reasons: the supply of antiquities is finite and each antiquity itself is unique.24 The 
availability of antiquities is solely dependent on further excavation of artifacts rather than by the 
“traditional process of manufacture in response to consumer demand.”25 Moreover, “uniqueness 
is inherent in each antiquity.”26 Therefore, when such items reach the international markets, 
collectors stand to pay anywhere from tens of thousands of dollars to millions for some element 
of antiquity.27 For example, in 1994, a six-foot long panel, attributed to the Assyrian empire, sold 
at a US auction for $11.8 million – the highest price ever paid at that time for an antiquity.28
 
 
Therefore, the Iraqi government sought protections both nationally and internationally for items 
of cultural heritage. 
B. Iraq’s Antiquities Laws 
 Iraq’s cultural property and archaeological sites remained well-protected under nationally 
imposed antiquities law following World War I.29 For example, Iraq’s 1936 Antiquities Law No. 
59, amended in 1974 and 1975, considered all antiquities property of the state and prohibited 
private individuals from acquiring movable antiquities.30
                                                                                                                
23 Id.  
 Moreover, the Iraqi government only 
permitted authorized groups to excavate antiquities, prohibiting private landowners from 
24 Borke, supra note 12, at 387-388. 
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 Miller, supra note 20, at 51. 
28 Id. at 52. 
29 Norman Hammond, In the Fray: Time to Secure Iraq’s Treasures, WALL ST. J. EUR., April 17, 
2003, stating that “the new antiquities laws put in place by Gertrude Bell after World War I 
ensured that the new Kingdom if Iraq retained much of its heritage.” 
30 Borke, supra note 12, at 383-386.  
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excavating on their own lands without government issued permits.31 Antiquities laws also 
provided for extensive criminal punishments for violations including the use of fines, seizure and 
confiscation, and imprisonment for violators.32
 Protection of Iraqi artifacts increased with the rise of Saddam Hussein’s regime in the 
1960s.
   
33 A great patron of the arts, Saddam Hussein imposed strict exportation regulations on 
antiquities in an effort to “keep a tight lid on stuff” and allow “very little to get out.”34 It was 
only in the early 1990s, following the Gulf War, that the Iraqi national government began to lose 
control over the exportation of Iraqi artifacts and over the looting of Iraqi archaeological sites.35
 
 
C. International Cultural Heritage Protection 
 Nevertheless, the Iraqi government ensured assistance in the protection of their cultural 
property from the international community by becoming a state party to the 1954 Hague 
Convention and the 1970 UNESCO Convention.36 Under the 1954 Hague Convention, two 
protocols were adopted to protect items newly termed as “cultural property,” items considered 
the “cultural heritage of all mankind;” contributions by the global community to the “culture of 
the world.”37 The first protocol requires an obligation by parties to safeguard cultural property 
within their own territories in times of peace.38 The second protocol calls on parties to prevent 
the targeting, theft, misappropriation, or destruction of cultural property during wartime.39
                                                                                                                
31 Id. at 384. 
  
32 Id. at 383.  
33 Miller, supra note 20, at 64. 
34 Id.  
35 Id. at 63. 
36 Borke, supra note 12, at 385. 
37 Naomi Mezey, The Paradoxes of Cultural Property, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 2004, 2010 (2007). 
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 2011. 
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 The Iraqi government guaranteed international cooperation with the illegal removal of 
cultural property during peacetime when it signed on to the 1970 UNESCO Convention.40 The 
1970 UNESCO Convention reiterated the goals of the 1954 Hague Convention to protect items 
of cultural property as “the basic elements of civilization and national culture.”41 Protection was 
ensured by the requirement that member states issue export licenses and develop a uniform 
system of administrative controls to “prevent both illegal import and export of cultural 
property.”42
 
 
D. Cultural Antiquities Looting in Iraq after the Gulf War 
 Despite both international and domestic protections for cultural property, Iraq suffered 
enormously from the looting of archaeological sites and items of cultural significance following 
the Gulf War in 1991 and paralleled only by the immense looting of items following the U.S. 
invasion in 2003. Small-scale digging of artifacts began in the 1990s when the United Nations 
imposed sanctions on Iraq leading many impoverished farmers into the archaeologically rich 
southern portion of Iraq.43 The same sanctions led to the general economic downfall of Iraq and 
a subsequent recession producing mass levels of poverty around the country.44 The extreme 
destitution led to lootings en masse of Iraqi museums and archaeological sites.45 Within three 
years following the Gulf War, ten of Iraq’s regional museums were attacked46
                                                                                                                
40 Jodi Patt, The Need to Revamp Current Domestic Protections For Cultural Property, 96 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1207, 1219 (2002). 
 and many 
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
43 Ondi Dybowski, Redefining the Relationship Between Law, Art & Culture: Balancing the 
Relationship in Iraq, 37 SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 65, 68 (2009).  
44 Miller, supra note 20, at 64. 
45 Id.  
46 Borke, supra note 12, at 389. 
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priceless artifacts were funneled outside of the country.47 From the end of the Gulf War until the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, “Iraqis established illicit trade networks, identified transport 
routes, and successfully learned how to smuggle.”48 Such skills would prove all too convenient 
when in 2003 masses stormed the Iraq National Museum to partake in a three day looting spree 
and significant numbers of Iraqi citizens partook in the destruction of dozens of archaeological 
sites following the U.S. invasion of Iraq.49
 
  
II. 2003 U.S. Invasion of Iraq 
 March 20, 2003 marks the day when the U.S. launched an over five years long invasion 
of Iraq.50 In the months preceding the invasion, the United Nations Security Council 
unanimously adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, offering Iraq, under 
Saddam Hussein, a “final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations.”51 The Iraqi 
government responded with numerous reports asserting its compliance with the Resolution.52  
However, the UN Security Council found the reports inaccurate, incomplete or contradictory.53
 On March 17, 2003, President George Bush expressed his dismay with the lack of Iraqi 
compliance of the Resolution 1441 issuing a March 19, 2003 deadline for compliance with the 
  
                                                                                                                
47 Miller, supra note 20, at 64. 
48 Borke, supra note 12, at 389. 
49 Id. at 400. 
50 Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Chronology of the Six-Week Invasion of Iraq, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/cron/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2010). 51  S.C.  Res.  1441,  ¶  2,  U.N.  Doc.  S/RES/1441  (November  8,  2002).  
52 Transcript of Chief U.N. Weapons Inspector Hans Blix delivered to the United Nations 
January 27, 2003, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/01/27/sprj.irq.transcript.blix/ (last visited 
Dec. 19, 2010).  
53 Id.  
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Resolution.54 At the same time, President Bush demanded that Saddam Hussein and his sons flee 
Iraq and that their refusal to do so would result in “military conflict commenced at a time of our 
choosing.”55 When “zero hour” arrived, the U.S., along with UK assistance, began its invasion of 
Iraq on March 20, 2003, with ground forces under American supervision attacking Baghdad and 
British forces, with the support of U.S. Marines, storming Basra.56
 
 What followed was close to 
seven years of destruction and devastation to both civilian populations and Iraqi cultural heritage. 
III. American Antiquities Protections and their Effects on the Looting of the Iraq 
National Museum and The Occupation of Babylon 
 
 Despite the vast criticism received by the U.S. in response to the Iraq invasion in 
general57, two events stand out in which the U.S. received heavy criticism for disregarding 
international obligations to protect items of Iraqi cultural heritage. First, the passive response by 
U.S. troops to the looting of the Iraq National Museum between April 9 and April 12, 200358 and 
secondly, the yearlong occupation and destruction of the ancient city of Babylon by American 
military forces.59
 To begin this discussion, it is important to first detail the American obligations under 
both international and American laws to items of cultural heritage. Second, I will detail the 
events of the looting of the Iraq National Museum and the immediate U.S. response to the 
 
                                                                                                                
54 Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Chronology of the Six-Week Invasion of Iraq, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/cron/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2010). 
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
57 Chronological Polls of the American People Questioning Appropriateness of U.S. Military 
Action in Iraq, http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2010).  
58 Borke, supra note 12, at 399. 
59 U.N. Educ., Scientific and Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Int’l Coordination Comm. for the 
Safeguarding of the Cultural Heritage of Iraq, Final Report on Damage Assessment in Babylon, 
U.N. Doc. CLT/EO/CIP/2009/RP/114 (June 26, 2009). 
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looting, specifically whether the American response conformed with international and domestic 
obligations. Next, it is significant to detail the circumstances of the U.S. occupation and 
desecration of Babylon. Finally, with respect to Babylon, whether the U.S. obeyed the 
obligations set forth in their adopted international and domestic laws when occupying Babylon. 
 
 
 
A.  American Obligations under Domestic and International Cultural Heritage 
Regulations 
 
1. The Lieber Code of 1863 
 One of the earliest provisions offering protection for items of cultural heritage, namely 
classical works of art, libraries, or scientific collections, was codified in the Lieber Code, issued 
in April 1863 for Union Army soldiers during the American Civil War.60 The Lieber Code 
detailed the conduct of Union soldiers during times of war ordering them to protect art, libraries, 
scientific collections and instruments “against all avoidable injury” even during times of 
bombardment or besiege.61  Moreover, the Lieber Code stated that if such works could be moved 
without injury to them, they may be seized for the benefit of a conquering nation and their 
ownership would be settled during negotiations for peace.62
                                                                                                                
60 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, prepared by 
Francis Lieber, LL. D., Originally issued as Orders No. 100, Adjutant General’s Office, 1863, 
Washington 1898; Government Printing Office at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Instructions-gov-armies.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 
2010). 
 In addition to requiring Union 
soldiers to reconsider attacking areas holding items of cultural significance, the Lieber Code 
61 Id. 
62 Id.  
12    
affirmatively required that Union soldiers, “‘acknowledge and protect’ cultural objects and sites 
in occupied territories.”63
 
 
2. The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions 
 The Lieber Code set the stage for the creation of the first international regulations to 
protect cultural heritage: the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions.64 With these conventions, 
signatory parties committed themselves to preserve cultural property and to abandon prior 
wartime norms of the “victor’s right to plunder.”65 The 1907 Hague Convention, in particular, 
became customary international law and therefore, binding on all nations, even those who were 
not signatories.66 This meant that even those who did not sign on to the 1907 Hague Convention 
were subject to legal proceedings in the event of the seizure or damage done to cultural property 
during times of war.67
 
  
3. The 1954 Hague Convention 
 Following World War II, and the inadequacies of prior Hague Conventions, the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), implemented the 1954 
Hague Convention.68
                                                                                                                
63 Matthew D. Thurlow, Protecting Cultural Property in Iraq: How American Military Policy 
Comports with International Law, 8 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 153, 157 (2005). 
 The 1954 Hague Convention committed signatory nations to 
“implementing peacetime measures to protect cultural property within its own borders in case of 
64 Dybowski, supra note 43, at 74. 
65 Id.  
66 Id.  
67 “All seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions of this character, historic 
monuments, works of art and science, is forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal 
proceedings.” Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2277, Art. 56. (1907 Hague Convention) 
68 Dybowski, supra note 43, at 78. 
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war.”69 Moreover, parties agreed to foster a sense of respect in their armed forces for the cultures 
of all people and in doing so prohibit the theft, pillage or vandalism of cultural property, both in 
a signatory’s own nation and in other nations where armed forces would encounter cultural 
heritage.70 Finally, in an effort to recognize the global interest that members states had in 
international cultural property, occupying nations were obliged to “ . . . take the most necessary 
measures…” to assist the occupied nation’s authority in preserving cultural property.71 Unlike 
the American adherence to the two prior Hague Conventions, the United States failed to ratify 
the 1954 Hague Convention until March 13, 2009.72
 
 
4. The 1970 UNESCO Convention 
 In 1970, UNESCO picked up where the Hague Convention of 1954 left off and 
developed the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting the Illicit Import, Export, 
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.73
                                                                                                                
69 David N. Chang, Stealing Beauty: Stopping the Madness of Illicit Art Trafficking, 28 HOUS. J. 
INT’L L. 829, 852 (2006).  
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nations.”74 Moreover, it reinforced the concept that cultural property “inherently belongs to and 
is within the exclusive control of the country of origin.”75
 More specifically, Article 7 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention requires parties to 
“prohibit the importation of cultural property stolen from a museum or monument in another 
participating country.”
 
76 In addition, Article 9 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention allows for 
parties threatened with destruction of their cultural heritage to ask other signatory parties for 
assistance in restricting imports and exports of illegally obtained cultural property.77 Articles 7 
and 9 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention are the only provisions adopted by the United States.78
 
 
B.  The Looting of the Iraq National Museum and the American Obligations under 
Domestic and International Law 
 
1. Pre-War Iraq National Museum Looting Warnings 
 In the months leading up to the Iraq War, scholars and archaeologists warned the U.S. 
Department of Defense that an invasion of Iraq risked destruction of Iraqi archaeological sites 
and more specifically, pillaging of the Iraq National Museum in Baghdad.79 Mesopotamian 
archaeological experts like McGuire Gibson of the University of Chicago provided the U.S. 
Department of Defense with a list of critical sites to avoid when invading Iraq and “explicitly 
warned [the Department of Defense] about the possibility of the looting of the Iraq Museum.”80
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 Other experts expressed the same concerns to the U.S. Department of Defense of the 
potential damage to the Iraq National Museum calling the museum “the single most important 
archaeological location in the country.”81 Additionally, the Archaeological Institute of America, 
in a strongly worded letter from President Nancy C. Wilkie, warned of the risk of damage as a 
result of invasion to such significant archaeological sites such as Uruk, Babylon, and Nineveh.82 
The same letter urged both the U.S. government and other international entities to work with the 
public of Iraq and international scholars specializing in Iraqi cultural heritage to protect 
“monuments, sites, antiquities and cultural institutions.83” The Archaeological Institute of 
America expressed a “profound concern” for the potential damage such sites [like Babylon, 
Nineveh, and Uruk] and pieces would incur upon commencement of the war.84
 
 
2. The Looting of the Iraq National Museum in April 2003 
 The looting of Iraq’s National Museum in Baghdad occurred between April 10 and April 
12, 2003, as American troops entered Baghdad in the final days of the Iraq War.85 Between 
150,000 and 200,000 objects representative of 10,000 years of Iraqi heritage filled the National 
Museum in Baghdad.86
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29_iraq.pdf. (detailing several of Iraq’s most significant archaeological sites). 
 The loss of Iraqi artifacts during the looting was severe for Iraqi citizens, 
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smashed” when a series of attacks were launched on the National Museum and priceless artifacts 
were stolen from it.87
 In the weeks before the looting, the National Museum staff acted on the looming threat of 
the American invasion by moving 179 boxes containing over 8,000 artifacts from the public 
gallery displays to a museum storage area.
  
88  In addition, the Ministry of Culture in Iraq ordered 
the museum to assemble teams of men and women to defend the museum compound in the event 
of an invasion, dividing groups by their designated tasks: first aid, fire prevention and control, 
and messengers.89 However, all attempts at thwarting an attack on the National Museum were 
abandoned when, within a matter of days, Americans had invaded Baghdad causing complete 
chaos and the beginning of the looting of the Iraq National Museum.90
 Initial reports following the looting noted that at least 170,000 artifacts had been stolen 
when looters violently took over the Iraq National Museum between April 10 and April 12, 
2003.
  
91 Key pieces looted included the Sacred Vase of Warka (ca. 3100 BC), the Golden Harp of 
Ur (ca. 2600-2500 BC), the Lioness Attacking a Nubian ivory (ca. 8th Century BC) and the twin 
copper Ninhursag Bulls (ca. 2475 BC).92 Also pillaged from the museum were over 1,000 pieces 
of gold jewelry and precious stones from 8th and 9th centuries B.C. consisting of the 
“spectacular” Treasure of Nimrud, excavated in the late 1980s in Iraq and considered one of the 
greatest finds in archaeological history.93
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 During the three-day looting, American troops reportedly failed to assist museum staffers 
when pressed for assistance with fending off looters.94 One staff member reported that on 
morning of April 10, 2003, approximately 400 people had gathered in the streets armed with 
bayonets, hammers, and crowbars ready to storm the museum grounds.95 The same staff member 
allegedly approached an American tank located on the side of the museum and through an 
interpreter, “begged the Americans to move their tanks in front of the museum to protect it.”96 
The American soldiers reportedly radioed for assistance, but were told that they were under 
orders not to move from their location.97
 Another account reported that shortly after the start of the looting, the curator of the Iraq 
National Museum appealed to American forces to assist in stopping the looting.
  
98 Several 
soldiers accompanied the curator back to the museum and fired over the heads of the looters, 
temporarily preventing looters from destroying the museum.99 However, soon after, American 
soldiers retreated from the area and looters returned to continue their ransacking of the Iraq 
National Museum.100
 
 
3. The American Response Immediately Following the Looting of the National Museum 
 Days after the looting, American forces led by Colonel Matthew F. Bogdanos, responded 
to the Iraq National Museum to investigate the looting.101
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team, reported that he treated the Iraq National Museum as a crime scene, conducting a “physical 
examination” of the entire premises and documenting “everything [he] saw.”102 The scene before 
him was “not promising” as he found Iraqi army uniforms and weapons scattered about the 
museum grounds.103 However, he resolved to establish a relationship with Iraq museum officials 
in order to begin the immediate return of the antiquities stolen from the museum.104
 Bogdanos reportedly worked alongside a number of Iraqi museum staff to design 
methods of identification and recovery of items stolen from the museum.
  
105 One of the more 
successful parts of Bogdanos’ mission was the amnesty program for the return of stolen Iraqi 
antiquities, instituted no more than two days after Bogdanos’ arrival in Baghdad.106 The end of 
2003 saw the return of over 1,935 antiquities given back as part of the amnesty program.107 
Some pieces including a 6th millennium BC Hassuna-style pot, the Sacred Vase of Warka, and a 
4,000-year old Akkadian tablet, were returned to Bogdanos personally while he was on leave in 
Manhattan in a crowded coffee shop, wrapped in a brown paper bag.108
 
  
4.   Additional American Responses to the Looting 
 In addition to the immediate U.S. response to the looting of the Iraq National Museum 
led by Colonel Bogdanos, the U.S. also condemned the looting and spoke to their inability to 
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protect the Iraq National Museum, and enacted the 2004 Emergency Protection for Iraqi Cultural 
Antiquities Act.109
  The looting of the Iraq National Museum in April 2003 as American forces stood by and 
merely watched priceless artifacts smuggled away was arguably one of the worst public relations 
disasters for the United States in modern times.
 
110 The American forces were “sharply criticized 
for ignoring the pillagers as they charged through the museum” despite the warnings from the 
international archaeological community, and more specifically, warnings from acclaimed 
American archaeologists that the safety of the Iraq National Museum was greatly threatened.111
 Looting is an unfortunate thing. Human beings are not perfect. And we’ve seek  
 looting in this country . . . No one likes it. No one allows it. It happens. And it’s 
 unfortunate . . . To the extent that it happens in warzone, it’s difficult to stop. The United 
 States is concerned about the museum in Baghdad, and the president and the secretary of 
 state and I have all talked about it, and we are in the process of offering rewards for 
 people who will bring things back, or to assist in find where those things might be.
 
In response, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, addressed the public at a Pentagon 
briefing in mid-April  2003 citing his department’s failure to properly protect Iraqi artifacts: 
112
 
 
Nevertheless, the international media demanded “…the United States…take affirmative steps to 
remedy the Iraqi antiquity situation in order to regain international respect.”113 The media 
suggested that the U.S. create some kind of legislation to assist in the recovery of the Iraqi 
antiquities.114
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 After legislation was proposed in both the Senate and the House of Representatives to 
begin assisting in the protection of Iraqi cultural heritage115, Congress ultimately passed the 
Emergency Protection of Iraqi Cultural Antiquities Act of 2004 (the “Iraqi Antiquities Act”) as 
part of the public law for the Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 2004.116 The 
legislation followed on the footsteps of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 
(the “UN Resolution 1483”), which required all members of the United Nations to prevent the 
illegal trade of cultural materials removed from the Iraq National Museum and other sites around 
Iraq.117
 Speaking at the introduction of the legislation to Congress, Senator Charles Grassley, 
who introduced the bill in June 2003, stated that the Iraqi Antiquities Act was a reflection of 
Congress’ adherence to the “full spirit” of UN Resolution 1483 and was also an “important 
signal of our commitment to preserving Iraq’s resources for the benefit of the Iraqi people.”
  
118 
The Iraqi Antiquities Act allowed the President to impose import restrictions on any cultural 
material illegally removed from Iraq.119 In addition, the legislation enabled the President to 
exercise his authority under the Cultural Property Implementation Act, enacted by the U.S. to 
conform to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, without the need for an Iraqi formal request for 
American assistance with reclaiming cultural heritage objects.120
 
  
                                                                                                                 
115 Borke, supra note 12, at 432.  
116 Emergency Protection for Iraqi Cultural Antiquities Act of 2004 Miscellaneous Trade and 
Technical Corrections Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108- 429, §§ 3001-3003 (2004).  
117 Id.  
118 Id.  
119 Archaeology Institute of America Press Release, 
http://www.archaeological.org/news/sitepreservation/143, (released, Dec. 7, 2004). 
120 Id.  
21    
5. U.S. Conformance with Domestic and International Obligations in Responding to the 
Looting of the Iraq National Museum 
 
 As previously noted, the only cultural heritage international obligations the United States 
had at the time of the invasion of Iraq were two provisions in the 1970 UNESCO Convention.121 
These two provisions required: (1) parties to prohibit the importation of cultural property stolen 
from a museum or monument in another participating country, and (2) for parties threatened with 
destruction of their cultural heritage to ask other signatory parties for assistance in restricting 
imports and exports of illegally obtained cultural property.122 The Iraqi Antiquities Act enacted 
in 2004 satisfies both provisions.123 With respect to the first provision, the Iraqi Antiquities Act 
allowed the U.S. to prohibit the importation of cultural property stolen from the Iraq National 
Museum without Iraqi officials even requesting assistance.124 By way of conforming to the first 
provision, the Iraqi Antiquities Act satisfies the second provision since it refers to the ability of 
Iraqi officials to request assistance.125
 In addition to satisfying their obligations under the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the U.S. 
also arguably far exceeded any obligations under the 1954 Hague Convention, despite not being 
a signatory to the 1954 Hague Convention until 2009.
 
126 For example,  Article 5, Section 1 of the 
1954 Hague Convention requires that an occupying party “support the competent national 
authorities of the occupied country in safeguarding and preserving its cultural property.”127
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for assistance against looters128, which would violate this article, the U.S. appropriately 
responded when American forces began working with National Museum officials to begin the 
stolen antiquities recovery process.129
 
  
C.  The U.S. Occupation of Babylon and American Obligations Under Domestic and 
International Law 
 
1. Background Information 
 On April 21, 2003, American and Polish forces entered the ancient city of Babylon, 
located approximately 55 miles south of Baghdad.130 By September 2, 2003, Babylon had been 
converted by American and Polish forces into “Camp Alpha,” a military stronghold until the 
location was surrendered to the Iraqi State Board of Antiquities and Heritage in December of 
2004.131 During their time at “Camp Alpha,” American and Polish forces established a military 
zone requiring fortification and defensive measures that caused severe direct and indirect damage 
to the site.132
 The city of Babylon is often regarded as one of the most archaeologically significant sites 
in the entire world.
 
133
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and King Nebuchadnezzar (604 – 562 BC), credited with building one of the Seven Wonders of 
the World, the Hanging Gardens of Babylon.134 However, after a series of enlargements and later 
failures, Babylon retreated into distant memory and was all but forgotten for hundreds of 
years.135
 Over the course of the next hundred years, archaeologists from around the world teamed 
up with Iraqi government officials to unearth the remains of the city of Babylon and to begin 
reconstructing ancient buildings to make them accessible to international visitors.
 
136 By the 
1970s, the work on the city of Babylon was transformed into the building of a new palace for the 
head of the Iraqi government, Saddam Hussein.137 During the 1980s, Hussein used the newly 
built palace as a summer home and frequently hosted nationalistic festivals on the site.138 
Hussein also outfitted the palace with modern fortifications and modern amenities such as a 
helicopter pad.139 It was features such as these that attracted Polish and American forces to 
Babylon in April 2003.140
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scraping, and leveling by the occupation of Polish and American soldiers has been called one of 
the “gravest encroachments on this internationally known archaeological site.”141
 
 
2. UNESCO’s Response to the American Occupation of Babylon 
 When U.S. forces transferred hold of Babylon to the Iraq State Board of Antiquities and 
Heritage, Iraqi officials quickly began studies on the state of the preservation of Babylon.142 
Their findings led them to request that UNESCO conduct a thorough investigation to determine 
the kind of damage suffered by the site and to prepare a series of measures aimed at developing a 
management and conservation plan.143 When UNESCO’s findings were complete, they compiled 
a “Final Report on Damage Assessment in Babylon” and detailed their recommendations to the 
State Board of Antiquities and Heritage in Iraq.144 Their findings included damage done before 
the American occupation of Babylon in 2003 and damages directly resulting from the American 
occupation.145
 Damages resulting from the American occupation starting in 2003 included excavation 
works to build trenches by removing soil containing ancient fragments of pottery, installation of 
barbed wire and steel stakes around archaeological grounds including a wall in a “sacred” 
precinct, and the removal of blocks along the path of “Processional Way” to make room for 
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paving of a street.146 The media also reported on the U.S. damage  detailing that military vehicles 
crushed 2,600-year old pavements and that dragons of the Ishtar Gate were marred by the 
attempted removal of their decorative bricks.147
 
  
3. The U.S. Response to their Destruction of Babylon 
 Three years after the American departure from Babylon, Colonel John Coleman, former 
Chief of Staff for the First Marine Expeditionary Force in Iraq, which occupied Babylon, issued 
an apology to the Iraqi Antiquities Board for the damage American forces did to Babylon.148 
Colonel Coleman argued, however, that the occupation of Babylon provided the ancient city with 
more protection than it would have seen had forces left the city alone.149 The Colonel discussed, 
how, when his forces arrived in Babylon the city’s museum as well as other archaeological sites 
had already been damaged and looted.150 He felt that the price to pay for military presence was 
far better than the price the Iraqi people would have paid had the site been left to the masses.151
 
  
4. U.S. Conformance with Cultural Heritage Obligations with Respect to the Occupation of 
Babylon 
 
 Because the U.S. was not a signatory to the 1954 Hague Convention, which would have 
dictated its obligations as an occupying force destroying cultural heritage, until 2009, its 
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obligations to the city of Babylon can only be evaluated in light of the 1907 Hague Convention. 
According to the 1907 Hague Convention, an occupying force would be subject to legal 
proceedings in the event of the destruction, seizure, or willful damage done to “historic 
monuments [and] works of art or science.”152
 
 In this case, because the U.S. engaged in the 
destruction of a historic monument, the entire city of Babylon, it would be held accountable in 
legal proceedings. However, because the 1954 Hague Convention superseded the 1907 Hague 
Convention, the United States would not be found to violate any international obligations when 
occupying Babylon. 
IV.  Current American Efforts at Iraqi Cultural Heritage Protection 
 On April 29, 2003, the United States State Department announced a contribution of $2 
million to “protect and restore Iraqi antiquities.”153 Specifically, the contribution would help to 
“protect and restore key museums and archaeological sites in Iraq.”154 The State Department 
noted the “value and respect” the American people had for Iraq’s cultural heritage in in-depth 
consultations with Iraqi cultural officials to determine Iraq’s cultural heritage protection 
needs.155 Identified needs included the establishment of a U.S. overseas research center in 
Baghdad, support for the development of an “at risk Iraqi antiquities list,” and a “searchable on-
line database of images from the Baghdad museum.”156
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 On October 16, 2008, the State Department announced the creation of the Iraq Cultural 
Heritage Project (ICHP), an initiative designed to assist in the preservation of the ancient history 
of Iraq.157 ICHP’s stated goals included cultivating a new generation of Iraqi archaeology 
professionals, and engaging U.S. cultural institutions as partners to work with the Iraq State 
Board of Antiquities and Heritage (SBAH) for cultural heritage preservation.158 One of the 
ICHP’s first tasks involved the award of a $13 million grant to International Relief and 
Development (IRD), a charitable, non-profit, non-governmental association directly involved in 
the assistance of “regions of the world that present social, political and technical challenges.”159 
IRD, working alongside SABH and the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, would assist in the creation of 
the following: (1) the National Training Institute for the Preservation of Iraqi Cultural Heritage 
in Ebril; (2) improvements to the Iraq National Museum in Baghdad, including redesigning 
collection displays and storage facilities; and (3) professional training programs for Iraqi 
archaeology and museum professionals in “collections management, conservation, education and 
management . . .”160
  In addition, the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) 
announced that it would provide an additional $1 million to these efforts and would lead efforts 
to secure up to $6 million in private sector contributions for similar projects designed to protect 
cultural heritage.
 
161
 On January 7, 2009, the United States State Department announced the creation of the 
“Future of Babylon Project,” a plan to manage and preserve the archaeological site of 
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Babylon.162 The State Department awarded $700,000 to the World Monuments Fund (WMF) to 
carry out preservation efforts in Babylon during a two year long project to “identify the purposes 
for which the site will be conserved and managed, and specify goals and policies to direct, guide, 
and regulate future uses and interventions at the site.”163 The State Department noted that the 
“Future of Babylon Project” came about as “concerns surfaced about damages done to the 
ancient site . . . as a result of the use of parts of the site for military installations” back in 2004.164 
The Project would address the concerns raised in 2004 and would provide for future assistance to 
develop technologically and culturally appropriate conservation solutions to incorporate “holistic 
preservation approaches embracing environmental, social, and economic factors,” and would 
even provide for Babylonian “economic self-sufficiency.”165
 In addition, WMF describes the desire to create a “site management plan” that will 
address issues such as site boundaries in Babylon to define where further excavation may take 
place.
  
166 WMF states as one of its goals that the site management plans will assist in addressing 
boundaries where a Babylon Museum could be created and ways that the site can “accommodate 
tourists.”167 Ultimately, WMF seeks to work with Iraqi officials to receive a “World Heritage 
Nomination” for Babylon.168
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V. American Cultural Heritage Contributions to Iraq as a Form of Foreign Aid 
 In light of the significant contributions provided by the State Department to Iraq for the 
sole purpose of preserving Iraqi cultural heritage, it appears that the State Department is, in fact, 
doing more to help the country as a whole than just helping with an isolated issue such as 
cultural heritage preservation. To illustrate this idea, one may note the vast difference between 
the contributions given to Iraq and those given to other countries for the purpose of cultural 
heritage preservation. As of December 2010, the State Department has contributed over $14 
million to Iraqi cultural heritage preservation;169 it has contributed a total of $26 million to all 
countries around the world for cultural heritage projects in the past ten years.170
 In addition, a number of the projects the State Department sponsors in Iraq sound of the 
same foreign aid principals described by U.S. foreign aid programs. For instance, the desire to 
provide an education system to create homegrown Iraqi archaeologists sounds very much like 
other education programs created by U.S. government initiatives. In the same vein, providing the 
SBAH and WMF with funds to help make Babylon into what sounds like a tourist destination, 
appears very much like the economic and infrastructure projects foreign aid is designed to create. 
 Therefore, the 
State Department has awarded Iraq with more than half of the total of what it has awarded every 
other country in the world for cultural heritage projects.  
 To analyze whether the U.S. is engaging in distributing foreign aid to Iraq, it is important 
first, to define what exactly is foreign aid. Then, discuss how for the most part, foreign aid given 
to Iraq has taken on a special form in that substantial funds are funneled to Iraq yearly with no 
comparable distributions to other countries. And finally, discuss how efforts of the U.S. State                                                                                                                 
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Department towards cultural heritage protection are very much foreign aid in the same way other 
kinds of foreign aid are provided to Iraq. 
 
A.  The Definition of Foreign Aid 
 The concept of U.S. provided foreign aid dates back to at least 1947 with the passage of 
the Marshall Plan.171 The Marshall Plan heralded a new era in international foreign assistance by 
providing European countries, ravaged by World War II, with financial and technical help.172 By 
1960, the American approach to foreign assistance was geared towards providing aid to countries 
“recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reform.”173 In 
the 1990s, American foreign aid was expanded to include a “sustainable development” 
approach.174 This approach called on countries that needed help to capitalize on their “capacity 
as a country to improve its own quality of life.”175
 In recent years, foreign aid has been divided into five major categories: economic and 
social assistance (bilateral development assistance); economic aid supporting U.S. political and 
security objectives; humanitarian assistance; financing international development projects such 
as United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF); and military assistance.
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expended are directed towards economic and social assistance and economic and political 
security.177
 Funds are typically distributed by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), an independent federal government entity.
 
178 USAID is allotted 
approximately one-half of one percent of the federal budget to assist developing nations with 
economic and social improvements.179 For example, USAID has worked to provide 
immunization programs, education programs, and small business loans to foster local economic 
development in nations in which it administers assistance.180
 
 
B.  Special Treatment Given to Iraq in the Form of Foreign Aid: Generally 
 In addition to the U.S. government’s numerous financial aid projects around the world, 
the government has taken special care in expending funds for reconstructing Iraq.181 In a 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress dated April 15, 2004, writers of the 
“Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy” described the U.S. 
assistance program to Iraq as the largest foreign aid initiative since the 1948 Marshall plan.182 
The report describes how foreign aid has been directed at improving security capabilities of the 
Iraqi police and military, promoting democracy, and providing funds for infrastructure 
development throughout Iraq, including electricity, oil, water and sewage projects.183
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2004, nearly $21 billion were provided to Iraq in foreign assistance, with at least $1 billion to 
follow, and funds for Iraq were totaled separately from funds directed at other nations.184
 In addition, as regards to humanitarian aid distributed by USAID, Iraq received $2.3 
billion out of the allotted $13.3 billion to be distributed by USAID on international projects.
  
185 
The humanitarian efforts include creating local governments in over 600 cities, rehabilitating 
2,500 schools, vaccinating 3 million children, and reviving marshlands in southern Iraq.186
 
 
C.  Additional Special Treatment Received by Iraq in the Form of Foreign Aid for 
 Cultural Heritage Preservation 
 
 Judging by the amount of money expended for efforts in Iraq in general and the overall 
separate treatment in funding for Iraq, it is entirely likely that funds directed at cultural heritage 
preservation (currently at over $14 million187
 To illustrate this concept, take the creation of the ICHP. The ICHP seeks collaborations 
between Iraqi people and highly regarded cultural institutions in order to provide educational 
opportunities to foster a new line of archaeology specialists in Iraq.
) are the same type of “special assistance” the U.S. 
is providing Iraq in other arenas. In fact, the funds provided to Iraq for cultural heritage 
preservation are exactly the same economic and social development assistance foreign aid 
ordinarily seeks to address.  
188
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schools in Iraq.189
 Similarly, the attempts at making Babylon a tourist destination
 The ICHP is merely supplementing these programs for higher-level education. 
In this case, it is more specifically targeted at developing Iraqi archaeologists. 
190 is also analogous to the 
economic assistance USAID hopes to generate in projects dealing with small business funding 
and infrastructure development.191 Tourist destinations need buildings, roads, running water, and 
other basic necessities that USAID provides in such initiatives.192 The tourist destination concept 
would also foster economic growth by providing employment opportunities to locals, which will 
lead to the rebuilding of an entirely new city: housing complexes, transportation systems, and 
utility providers. In fact, this kind of aid is already being provided to Iraq as noted in the 
Congressional Report of 2004, detailing funding for Iraqi electricity, water, oil and sewage 
projects.193
 
 Therefore, the tourist funding for Babylon is merely the same kind of support the 
United States already gives Iraq – in this case, it is for cultural heritage preservation.  
D.  Reasons for the U.S. Providing Foreign Aid Cultural Heritage Protection to Iraq 
 There is no doubt that Iraq needed financial assistance since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime. This is clearly evidenced by the separately funded initiatives hovering in the billions of 
dollars range provided to the country since 2003.194
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Babylon.195 The looting of the Iraq National Museum as U.S. soldiers stood by was considered a 
“public relations disaster,”196 especially in light of “the fact that the United States failed to 
prevent a predictable disaster.”197
 The international community expressed similar sentiments about the damage done by the 
U.S. occupation of Babylon.
  
198 The damage assessment prepared by UNESCO called the use of 
Babylon as a military base “a grave encroachment on this internationally known archaeological 
site.”199 Military officials allegedly caused both direct and indirect damage on the site by 
creating trenches and leveling buildings.200 Damage to the certain monuments such as the Ishtar 
Temple and the Inner City Wall required “emergency interventions” by the SBAH.201
 Together, these two incidents directly involving U.S. military forces proved to be a 
“serious international relations crisis.”
 
202 One commentator noted that in the aftermath of the war 
in Iraq, the “White House . . . learned . . . [that] art is a mighty weapon in the battle for hearts or 
minds. Lose or abuse the treasures of ancient civilizations, or fail to prevent others from doing 
damage, and incur a blast of international disapproval.”203
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respect.”204 The U.S. was required to take “affirmative steps to remedy the Iraqi antiquity 
situation in order to regain international respect.”205
 The affirmative steps the U.S. took to remedy the Iraq situation included enacting the 
Emergency Protection for Iraqi Cultural Antiquities Act of 2004
  
206 and expending millions of 
dollars on cultural heritage preservation efforts207, especially in the areas where the U.S. received 
the most criticism: allowing looters to take the Iraq National Museum and in occupying, and 
thereby destroying, the ancient city of Babylon.208
 
  
VI. Potential Changes to U.S. Cultural Heritage Preservation Efforts in Light of the 
 Extensive Assistance Given to Iraq   
 Over the past ten years, the United States has taken great strides in proving its dedication 
to cultural heritage preservation. For example, the United States adopted the 1954 Hague 
Convention in March 2009.209 Moreover, since 2000 the U.S. State Department has been 
involved in disbursing millions of dollars towards international cultural heritage through the U.S. 
Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Heritage Preservation.210
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workshops in Colombia, Honduras, and Cambodia on topics relating to the protection of cultural 
resources from looting and illicit trafficking.211
 However, the incredible efforts directed at Iraq are simply unprecedented and are 
unlikely to continue in the future with other countries. That is, unless the U.S. engages in the 
direct destruction of cultural heritage as a result of invasion. The fact that the U.S. received so 
much criticism from the international community, surely, proved to be the necessary stimulus in 
garnering U.S. attention towards efforts at cultural heritage preservation. The overwhelming 
response to Iraq, in particular, is undeniably a response to the direct involvement in the 
destruction of Babylon and the passive response to the Iraq National Museum Looting. 
 
 The fact that the U.S. engages in yearly efforts at assisting other countries, however, is 
certainly not insignificant. The U.S. is still involved in donating over $1 million to international 
efforts solely for the purpose of cultural heritage preservation.212
 
 Yet, as previously stated, these 
efforts are akin to the foreign aid efforts the U.S. already provides these countries. Together then, 
this shows a great commitment on part of Americans to helping developing nations in all areas; 
even areas the U.S. has traditionally ignored like cultural heritage. 
VII. How Cultural Heritage Foreign Aid from the U.S. Will Help Iraq: A New Iraqi 
 Identity? 
  
 The restoration of the Iraq National Museum and the city of Babylon will undoubtedly 
assist the Iraqi people in some way. Even if the Iraqi people, themselves, are not so emotionally 
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invested in the idea of cultural heritage preservation, the infrastructure development with 
rebuilding these areas will provide economic and social improvements. The rebuilding efforts 
will lead the way towards better housing in those areas, modern facilities, improvements in 
transportation, and job opportunities.  
 Additionally, these efforts may prove to be a stimulus for a new Iraqi identity. Cultural 
property is generally viewed under two paradigms: cultural nationalism and cultural 
internationalism.213 Cultural nationalists view cultural property has providing “a citizenry with a 
historical link to its past.”214 Cultural internationalists see cultural property as “belonging to the 
heritage of the world.”215
 Even under these paradigms, the foreign assistance provided for cultural heritage 
preservation will lead to renewed Iraqi identification with cultural heritage. If the country takes 
rebuilding efforts under a cultural nationalists perspective they will internalize the meaning of 
certain cultural heritage items and focus on it as a “preservation of national identity.”
 
216 If the 
Iraqi people view rebuilding efforts under a cultural internationalists perspective they will view 
their cultural property as a “contribution to the culture of the world”217
 
 and will be able to 
engage in viewing themselves as part of a greater international community. 
 Conclusion 
 In conclusion, regardless of which view of cultural identity the Iraqi people end up 
taking, in the greater scheme of things U.S. efforts at cultural heritage preservation will surely 
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foster economic and social growth following years of war and devastation. It is unlikely that Iraq 
will become the tourist destination the WMF hopes any time soon, but the U.S. efforts at cultural 
heritage preservation will enable the Iraqi people to develop at least some kind of economic 
growth with just basic assistance in infrastructure in these areas. It would be overly ambitious to 
accord the U.S. with the credit for creating a “new Iraq identity” in terms of cultural heritage 
preservation, but the U.S. may have played a role in jumpstarting new efforts at creating an 
international dialogue for preservation of Iraqi cultural heritage. The artifacts and the 
appreciation for them have always existed in Iraq, as evidenced by the determination and 
dedication exhibited by the staff of the Iraq National Museum in response to the looting and by 
the outcry following the U.S. occupation of Babylon, but now the international community can 
once again become involved in preserving cultural heritage at large and specifically the heritage 
of the Iraqi people.  
